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PROPOSED LEGISLATION AS TO FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ROSCOE POUND*

In a sense the rise of administrative tribunals and administrative adjudication in the United States miht be said
to begin with the setting up of the Interstate Commerce
Comnnission in 1887. But it had its beginnings in the states
at least a decade before. A changed attitude towtrd administration begins to be manifest in the courts as far back as
1880. It had become necessary with the development of
administration in an increasingly urban, industrial society.
In our earlier polity, the traditional common-law j.3alousy of
administration, developed in England in the contests between
the courts and the Stuart Kings, reinforced by exrerience in
America of royal governors carrying out instructions from
England, and kept alive by the distrust of administration in
pioneer societies, took form in an over-narrow conception of
the separation of powers which proved unworkable in the
transition from a rural agricultural to an urban industrial
society. The way out was shown by Chief Justice Marshall
in 1825.1 He pointed out that there were governmental powers of doubtful classification, which might be classi,ied properly in more than one of the constitutional departments of
government, and that in such cases it was a proper legislative
function to assign the power to one of the appropriate departments. He showed this in connection with rulns of procedure in the courts. Much later it came to be recognized
in connection with rate-making power in regulation of public
utilities. 2 More recently application of standards, where discretion or judgment as to reasonableness was involved, came
to be committed to administrative agencies by legislation,
and the courts gradually recognized that this was within
the principle set forth by Chief Justice Marshall.3
There was a steady growth of administrative agencies in
the states in the last decade of the nineteenth century and
*

1.
2.
3.

Dean Emeritus, Harvard Law School. An address delivered befor the annual meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association,
Sept. 1, 1944.
Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42-43 (1825).
Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476 (1914).
Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230,
245-246 (1915).
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the first decade of the present century as part of the rise
of social legislation. At first, this produced a certain friction
with the courts. Some state courts adhered obstinately to
a narrow analytical view of the separation of powers. Not
appreciating Marshall's doctrine, they held that every detailed power of government must necessarily be assigned
exclusively once and for all to some one department of government. Thus well into the present century legitimate conferrings of power upon administrative agencies were sometimes held unconstitutional. This led many advocates of administrative development to denounce the separation of powers which is fundamental in American constitutional law.
Moreover, our common law, as we had received it from seventeenth and eighteenth-century England, was very strict as to
tribunals of special or limited jurisdiction. Their jurisdiction
was not presumed. The facts giving them jurisdiction had
to be set forth with particularity, and errors in not following
the procedure prescribed by the statute creating them would
invalidate their orders. Unless they complied strictly with
these requirements their proceedings might be enjoined.
In consequence, in the last decade of the nineteenth century almost every administrative proceeding or determination
of any consequence encountered a suit for an injunction.
This situation was aggravated by retarded development of
simpler remedies by way of judicial review of administrative
adjudication. The common-law remedies for review of the
administrative action were not devised for the type of administrative agencies which were being set up, and review
by suit in equity, which had to be resorted to in the absence
of other adequate remedy, was likely to have the incidental
effect of substituting the discretion of the court for that of
the administrative agency. What was especially irksome was
subjection of administrative agencies to strict adherence to
the rules of evidence which had grown up for jury trials
and to common-law procedural ideas. Indeed, the condition
of legal procedure in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was far from satisfactory in many respects and was
not well adapted to review of administrative determinations.
A, more liberal attitude toward administrative agencies
may be seen as far back as 1880. In the first decade of the
present century there began to be a changed attitude toward
social legislation and a steady improvement of procedure in
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the courts, so that the condition which obtained in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century was passing. But the
attempts of administrative agencies to achieve independence
of law and of judicial scrutiny of their action htve gone on
as if the legal procedure of the 'nineties and the judicial
attitude of the last century still continued.
As we look back on the beginnings of American administrative law we can well understand how it came about that
relief was sought from a bad adjustment between law and
administration and between courts and administrative agencies. Thus legislatures and administrative agencies went too
far, and this led to a growing administrative absolutism
which attracted attention under the regime of prohibition and
has since become a serious problem. As far back as 1908,
a tendency to relieve administrative agencies from judicial
review wherever and so far as possible had been noticed. Today exemption from judicial scrutiny of its action seems to
be the ambition of every administrative agency, federal and
state, and is urged by a group of writers and teachers with
increasing insistence. As a result, with the multiplication
of these agencies in the federal government, the increasing
subjection of every form of activity to administrative regulation, and hostility of administrative agencies to attempts to
impose effective legal checks upon them, we have come to a
condition of administrative absolutism in practice, and have
been moving fast toward administrative absolutism in theory.
This is nothing short of revolutionary in our American polity,
and some academic teachers of the science of politics do not
hesitate to pronounce it a revolution and to praise it as such.
It would be hard to find anything more at variance with
American constitutional -government than the unlimited authority exercised by many of the federal agencies today and
even by their subordinates, as well as by a host of state agencies. As Mr. Justice Miller put it in 1874, speaking for the
Supreme Court of the United States, "the theory of our
governments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of
unlimited power anywhere."'4 Our legislative process is subjected to effective checks. A bill must be introduced publicly.
It is printed and available for public scrutiny. It is discussed
in the press. It is referred to a committee and in a matter
of any importance hearings are had. It is read three times
4. Loan Ass. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 663 (1874).
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before each house, is discussed publicly in committee of the
whole , and after passing both houses is sent to the executive
for approval or veto. Everyone whose interests are to be
affected has abundant opportunity to be heard and present
his objections. Judicial rule-making also provides carefully
for taking account of the claims of all who may be affected.
Rules of court are drafted by committees of judges, practicing lawyers, and law teachers, or by judicial councils; the
drafts are printed and given wide circulation; they are referred for criticism to bar association committees, or to committees of the bar in different circuits; they are discussed
before bar associations and in the legal periodicals; and they
are only adopted after everyone having an interest has been
fully heard. Administrative rule-making is in striking contrast. Often administrative rules and regulations having the
force of laws affect interests of as much or even more significance to individuals as those affected by statutes or rules
of court. But there are no such checks upon administrative
rule-making power. Usually the first knowledge that those
affected have of a rule is after it has gone into effect. The
first opportunity they have to object to it or to its details
is after it is sought to be enforced against them and they
may be afforded an opportunity to attack it in the courts.
But by this time serious and irreparable injury may have
been done to an individual and his business. Moreover, the
scope given to administrative rule-making today is so wide
that challenging of details in the courts is not easy and often
is not effectively available.
Even more serious is the lack of effective checks upon
administrative procedure and administrative orders. It is
not uncommon for these agencies to give notice or make
complaint on one point or ground and, after a hearing in
which the respondent directs himself to that point, to make
an order upon another. As a general thing, one can know
in advance the rules of conduct and policies which will be
applied to his case by a court. But it is a characteristic
tendency of present-day administrative agencies to use as a
ground of decision some idea of policy not to be found in
the statute or general law nor in any formulated rule of the
agency-to reach its result on some extra-legal basis for the
particular case, which it does not hold itself bound to follow
in the next case but justifies on some ground or policy no-
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where established or declared. Only last year the Supreme
Court of the United States had to remind the SEC that before transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied
their business consequences they must fall under tie ban of
some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of government authorized to prescribe such standards---Either the
courts or Congress or some agency to which Congress had
delegated the authority. In that case Congress had not forbidden the transaction, it was not forbidden by established
judicial doctrines.5 The commission had made no rule on
the subject. But it is not often that action outside of the
law appears so clearly on the face of the proceeding. The
committee of the Bar Association of San Francisco reported
in 1943 that the power of suspension exercised by the OPA
was "apparently unlimited." The report adds: "We have
no yardstick established by Congress or by any executive
or administrative agency, and Procedural Regulation No. 4
seems to leave the nature- and length of suspensicn to the
judgment (and thus to the caprice) of each individual Hearing Commissioner."' , Unlimited powers of this sort have no
place in the American system of government.
In two volumes of decisions of the federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals, covering decisions from June to September, 1943,7
and two volumes of decisions of the Federal District Courts
covering decisions from April to September, 1943,8 there are
sixteen cases, an average of four to a volume, of arbitrary
orders or orders going beyond the authority of the administrative agency. Yet we are told by the proponents of unrestrained administrative agencies that things should be
left as they are, to work themselves out, or that a few nugatory restraints are all that are required. It must be remembered that the ordinary man can seldom afford the remedies which alone are open to him under present conditions,
and hence only the orders which affect relatively large interests get before the courts. This makes the large number
of such cases in the reports doubly significant. As the San
5.
6.
7.
8.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318
U.S. 80, 92-93 (1943).
San Francisco Bar, December, 1943: Committee Report on the
Office of Administrative Hearings of the Office of Price Administration, 13.
136 and 137 Fed. 2d.
50 and 51 Fed. Supp.
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Francisco Bar Association report put it: "There is cause for
deep concern in the failure of Congress to impose reasonable
limitations on the powers of those administrative agencies."
Recent cases of administrative action without or beyond
authority are: A finding of the NLRB held by the Circuit
Court of Appeals "merely fiating and not finding;", a mandatory directive order to an employer by the NWLB, made
without recommendation to the President and without any
direction from the President, whereas the statutory function
of the Board is only to make recommendations to the President;1O an order of the NLRB requiring reinstatement of
seamen who mutinied in violation of an Act of Congress, the
Board considering this a "technical violation" of law, although the statute did not authorize orders of reinstatement
in such cases;", an order made without passing on a crucial
question of jurisdiction, as to which the Supreme Court of
the United States said that the statute "requires the Commission to heed the mandates of the Act and to make expert
determinations which are conditions precedent to its authority
to act."' 2 It should be noted that these are all very recent
cases decided by courts friendly to administrative agencies.
There are many cases within the last year in which such
agencies made determinations or orders without a basis in
the facts. In one case the court enjoined the action of a
subordinate of the Post Office Department in destroying a
mail order business without authority of law. 3 In another an
order of the NLRB was held "without support in the evidence."' 4 In another the finding and order of the Federal
Trade Commission were set aside as not supported by substantial evidence. 15 In another the Federal Power Commission, in determining value, as the court said, "fised a sort
of catch as catch can theory," and its disposition amounted
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Hutcheson, J. in Oklahoma Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 136 Fed. 2d,
42, 44 (1943).
Baltimore Fruit Co. v. Flynn, 50 Fed. Supp. 382, 389 (1943).
Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
Douglas, J. in City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685,
692 (1944).
Jarvis v. Shackelton Inhaler Co., 136 Fed. 2d, 116, 122 (1943).
Kansas City Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 Fed. 2d, 77, 84 (1943).
J. B. Lippincott Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 137 Fed. 2d,
490, 494 (1943).
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to no more than "guessing off" a substantial item of value."
In still another, the Secretary of Agriculture arbi; rarily imposed upon a Boston Handler of milk "the obligation to account for milk which it has never seen or touched, which
never reached the Boston market, and with the producers of
1
Inwhich it had no contractual relationship whatever."'
deed, some at least of these agencies claim authority to disbelieve evidence which is positive., uncontradicted, and not
inherently improbable. Thus in effect they claim to decide
on preconceived opinions as to the facts and make the hearing a mere farce. As the courts have said over and again,
to allow this is to vest triers of fact with authority to disregard the rules which safeguard the liberty and estate of
the citizen. The American Bar Association bill has a special
provision to meet this situation. In the last few years the
courts have been very liberal in sustaining administrative
action wherever at all possible. As one federal jiudge has
said: "Administrative agents have become so numrous and
government by regulation so extensive that courts, it is to
be feared, may gradually yield to their increasing insistence
and permit the rights of the people to be destroyed and subject them to control by regulations, which result was never
intended by the Constitution, apparently regarded t.s an outmoded instrument."1 8 Thus the number of reported cases
(six in three months of 1943) in which federal courts have
felt constrained to set aside such orders or to refuse to enforce them is highly significant.
Cases of assumption of powers beyond those granted the
administrative agency are very numerous in the reports, although the courts had called attention to this tendency long
ago and repeatedly. A few recent examples will suffice. A
treasury regulation "enlarged the legislative words' by inserting a clause relied on to exact a tax. The court said:
"Congress having imposed the tax upon 'the first domestic
processing' the administrative agency proceeeded by regulation to broaden the legislative enactment so as to provide
16.

Hutcheson, J. in Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,

17.

New England Dairies v. Wickard, 51 Fed. Supp. 444, 448 (1943).

136 Fed. 2d, 929, 933 (1943).

It was found that the record was "barren of any evidence" as the
basis of the order and that there was no evidence from which an
inference of the fact relied on could be drawn (p. 447).
18. Deaver, J. in Payne v. Griffin, 51 Fed. Supp. 588, 597 (1943).
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for its imposition not only upon the first domestic processing
but any subsequent processing which occurred first after the
effective date of the act."'19 Another treasury regulation
which the courts could not sanction was not only "contradictory if the plain terms" of the statue but "attempted to
add a supplementary legislative provision which could only
have been enacted by Congress." 20 In another case the administrator limited the area of production, on some theory
of his own with what the court pronounced "false and artificial boundaries. ' 2 1 In another the Social Security Board
made a regulation counter to the statute.2 2 Of such things
a federal judge said recently that these agencies and their
subordinates were showing an "increased ego" and "wish
to cow or to boss."
He added: "Universality, fairness and
justice are the right of all citizens and the duty of all law
enforcers toward citizens." 23 The San Francisco committee
says: "It seems to be a characteristic of some of the recently
established administrative agencies to assume that ordinary
citizens have nothing to do but fill out questionnaires and
otherwise serve in attendance upon the multifarious demands
of the administrative agencies. 2 4 As one studies these regulations two characteristics, which were also noticeable under the administration of the National Prohibition Act, stand
out: (1) Zeal to go beyond the powers conferred by the
statute creating the agency, and (2) a tendency to make
rules merely for the convenience of the agency or its subordinates at the expense of individual rights.
Some bureaus have contended and succeeded in getting
one important federal court to hold that when an administrative agency calls for an injunction to enforce its order the
courts are bound to grant it without applying the general
principles of equity which would govern in all other cases.2 5
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Durkee Famous Foods v. Harrison, 136 Fed. 2d, 303, 307 (1943).
Helvering v. Credit Alliance Co., 316 U.S. 107, 113 (1942).
Hollyhill Fruit Products v. Addison, 136 Fed. 2d, 323, 325 (1943).
See also Walling v. McCracken County Peach Growers' Assn, 50
Fed. Supp. 900, 905 (1943).
Kandelin v. Social Security Board, 136 Fed. 2d, 327, 328-329

(1943).

Atwell, J. in Brown v. Douglas, 50 Fed. Supp. 877, 880 (1943).
San Francisco Bar Association Committee Report, 10.
Brown v. Hecht Co., 137 Fed. 2d, 689 (1943). The District Courts
had divided on this question. Some of the strongest had held
that if there was a bona fide attempt on the part of the respondent
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The claim made by the bureau in that case would in effect
make the courts merely rubber stamps for the bureaus. The
Supreme Court of the United States was not willing to go so
far, 6 but it left the lower court very little margin for application of equitable principles, merely sending the case back for
further consideration instead of reinstating the decree of
the District Court denying the injunction.
Without any necessary intention of unfairnEss, administrative agencies have developed a characteristic unfairness
in their operation. Zeal for carrying out the special function
assigned to them leads them to look at their special task
out of proportion and to consider individual rights, constitutional guarantees, and the law of the land as negligible.
This is of long standing. In a recent address a former Attorney General of the United States told of his difficulties
with zealous young men in the Department of Justice who
felt it their duty to be unfair toward those against whom
the Department was proceeding. But the administrative
agencies have been encouraged in this attitude by, an idea,
often asserted by prominent personages, that the law was
protecting sinister interests and that the courts were juggling cases instead of getting down to the merits. A leading
teacher of administrative law tells us that many administrative agencies were meant to be unfair. No such attitude
would be tolerated in courts. They are expected to deal fairly
and equally by all.
In a typical recent case Judge Hutcheson (of Texas) said:
"We cannot agree with the conclusion of the [National Labor
Relatiofis] Board that the respondents have had the fair
trial by an impartial and distinterested trier of facts which
the law accords them. Whatever ought to be said of the
examiner's persistent and partisan efforts to conduct the
to comply with the law and the regulations, and no di.position to
violate them in the future, the court would deny the injunction
with leave to apply for one if it appeared later that there was

a likelihood of violation. Knox, J. in Walling v. Casale, 51 Fed.
Supp. 520, 526-527 (1943); Walling v. Buettner, 133 Fed. 2d,
306 (1943); Brown v. Southwest Hotels, 50 Fed. Supp. 147,
The tendency to use power oppressively against
150-151 (1943).
individuals who are trying to comply with the law and the regulations is strikingly brought out in some of these cases where constant and rapid turnover of employees interfered with full and
meticulous filling out of long and detailed questionnaires.

26.

Hecht v. Bowles, 64 S. Ct. Reporter, 587 (Feb. 28, 1944).
the concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J. p. 592.

See
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proceedings to a decision favorable to the Board, if the examiner really had been in the position he assumed that he
was in, of an agent of the Board to sustain its charges, it
cannot be successfully denied that his general attitude was
not impartial but partial, not disinterested but partisan . . .
Such an attitude, excusable if not commendable in a prosecutor, is a wholly improper one in a judge or an examiner
who sits in a judicial place to hear and determine facts, draw
conclusions of law, and make reports and recommendations
based thereon." The Board had "approved all the acts and
conduct of the examiner, completely exonerated him of bias
or prejudice, adopted each of his findings, drew conclusions
of law, and made reports and recommendations based thereon." The Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the order and
sent the case back to the Board "so that respondents may
be accorded the fair and impartial trial guaranteed to them
27
by law."
In another late case the court said: "It is difficult to
see why the National Labor Relations Board should use its
authority in an attempt to require, allegedly in the public
interest, that the plaintiff company re-employ one who has
been discharged for attempting to operate one of the plaintiff's cars while under the influence of liquor-a fact which
stands undenied on the pleadings, briefs, and arguments., except by the self-serving declaration of the employee himself."2 8 In still another case the same Board would not allow a laborer what was due him by law because lie returned
to work pending a strike. In other words, it sought to coerce
an employee who thought the strike ill-advised nevertheless
to remain on strike.2 9 This particular administrative agency
has attained a bad eminence in this matter of unfairness.
For example, it was shown that a trial examiner of the Board,
during a hearing, held an all day conference with the trial
attoreny, the regional attorney of the Board, and the regional
director 1° -as if a trial judge, in the absence of the accused,
27.
28.
29.
30.

National Labor Relations Board v. Phelps, 136 Fed. 2d, 562, 566567 (1943).
Baltimore Traction Co. v. Flynn, 50 Fed. Supp. 382, 389 (1943).
Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 136 Fed. 2d, 175, 181 (1943).
This part of the Board's order was set aside by the Circuit Court
of Appeals.
House Rep. no. 3109, 76th Congress, 3d Session, pt. 1, p. 138. See
also National Labor Relations Board v. Washington Dehydrated
Foods Co., 118 Fed. 2d, 980 (1941); Stephens, J. in Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 120 Fed. 2d, 614 (1941); Consolidated Edison
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and during the trial, were to hold such a conference with the
prosecuting attorney, the director of prosecutions, and the
attoiey general. If a judge did such a thing he would be impeached. If it is done by an official of an administrative
agency the case is merely sent back to be heard anew. But
the NLRB has not been unique in this matter of unfairness.
The Report of the Committee of the Bar Association of San
Francisco has much to say as to unfairness of the OPA.3 1 The
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
reporting in 1941, found clear unfairness as to issuance of
32
subpoenas in many agencies.

On the whole, there has been little idea of fairness as
between the government and the citizen. The interests of
private persons are held negligible in the zeal of the administrative agency to get results. The tendency is to weight procedure heavily in favor of the bureaus; to assume that those
charged are only filibustering or are malefactors of great
wealth, and that hearing their side is a bothersome formality.
This attitude has been conspicuous in rules and practice as
to subpoenas. They have frequently gone on the assumption
that the case against the respondent had been established to
the agency in advance and so it was a waste of time to allow
him to make his case. However, the San Francisco committee attended a hearing at which the proceeding was against
the keeper of a small restaurant in a town of no great size.
As the committee points out, so far from being a malefactor
of great wealth, the respondent might be the struggling operator of a small sandwich counter. But the regulitions the
committee was considering were not framed to give him a
fair opportunity to make a defense.3 3
In administrative adjudication there is an obstinate tendency going counter to what has always been the first principle of judicial justice, namely, to hear the other side. Indeed, the tendency is to decide without a hearing, or without hearing one of the parties, or after conference with one
of the parties in the absence of the other, whose interests
are adversely affected, or to treat the statutory requirement
of a hearing as a mere formality and decide upon preformed
opinions as to the order to be made. Another closely related
31.

San Francisco Report, pp. 9-12 (1943).

32. Report of Committee on Administrative Procedure, 124-125 (1941).
33.

San Francisco Report, pp. 10-11 (1943).
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tendency is to make determinations on the basis of reports
not divulged, giving the party affected no opportunity to
refute or explain. Another is to make determinations seriously affecting individual rights without a basis in evidence of
rational probative force. Another no less widespread but
not easy to reach under the statutes and procedure of today,
is to set up and give effect to policies beyond or even at
variance with the statutes or the general law governing the
action of the administrative agency. It is very easy to say
that the public interest demands or justifies activity beyond
or in contravention of the statute and to cover this up by a
general pronouncement upon the case. Usually this is done
out of zeal to promote assumed social ends to which the legislative body might or might not agree. It involves a degree
of legislative power in administrative agencies which is not
given them and ought not to be given them in a constitutional
polity. Indeed, the apologists for administrative absolutism
do not claim that it consists with our constitutions, state and
federal. But they say that we must look at these things
"against a background of what we expect the government to
do," and apparently in the administrative quest of social objectives it is considered that we do not expect agencies of
government to treat the citizen fairly, even if we did when
our constitutions were framed. We are told that the separation of powers antedates the rise of administrative attainment of social purposes and must not be suffered to stand
in the way.
As Mr. Justice Jackson has aptly put it, "findings cannot be said to have been fairly reached unless materials which
might impeach, as well as what will support its findings is
heard and weighed. 34 Again, as said in another late case
of unequal action by a federal commission, "where one industry 3tt of many in a highly competitive field is singled
out and subjected to a tariff not imposed on any other., and
under compulsion of an order from the commission is obliged
to pay such tariff for a number of years, without action to
establish like tariffs for competing industries, the order becomes an instrument of destruction. Such treatment long
continued could only mean extinction of the industry so affected. So surely as the power to tax is the power to de34. National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & M. El. Co., 318 U.S.
9, 28 (1943).
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stroy, so is the power of rate regulation when applied inequitably." 35 Again, in setting aside an order of the National
Mediation Board, as contrary to law, the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia said: "As a result tha action of
the Board is to force this particular group of employees to
accept representation by an organization in whichi it has no
right of membership nor right to speak or be h3ard in its
own behalf. This obviously is wrong and, if &;sented to,
would create an intolerable situation." 36 In such cases there
is usually departure from the standard set by the statute
creating or governing the agency. Of this charac.teristic of
administrative determinations an exceptionally able judge
said recently that difficulty in regulation of an industry does
not "justify a departure from the standard set by the statute.
Under the guise of effecting its policy we ought not to disregard the means to which the realization of the policy is
37
confided."
In effect, often these agencies follow the statutes or
their regulations or do not follow them, as they may choose
in a particular case. In a recent case where the adrinistrative
official denied application of a provision in the regulations
because of what he thought an economic reason, the Circuit
Court of Appeals said: "An adjustment provision in a regulation has the force of law. . . If an applicant makes out
a case within the framework of the adjustment provision,
the denial of relief by the administrator must be deemed as
an arbitrary act. The administrator is no less obligated to
give the relief called for by the adjustment provision because of the discovery through experience that tCe adjustment provision is ill-advised and inappropriate and embarrasses the general administration of the regulation. If such
has proved to be the case, the thing to do is to revoke or
amend the adjustment provision." 38 In that case contracts
had been entered into in reliance on the adjustment provision.30 The administrator claimed to leave it where he could
apply it when he chose and at the same time disregard it
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Wabash R. Co. v. United States, 51 Fed. Supp. 141, 143 (1943).
Groner, C. J. in Brotherhood of R. & S. Clerks v. United Employees, 137 Fed. 2d, 817, 820-821 (1943).
Learned Hand, J. in Queensborough Farm Products v. Wickard,
137 Fed. 2d, 969, 983 (1943).
Armour Co. v. Brown, 137 Fed. 2d, 233, 240-241 (1943).
Ibid. 241.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20

when he chose. This is the royal dispensing power which
was supposed to have come to an end in 1688. The administrator conceived he could make rules having the force of
law and dispense with them as he saw fit, leaving them in
force in case he saw fit to apply them.
It is specially significant to note the obstinate resistance of federal administrative agencies to requirements of
hearing, to appeal from their orders, and to stay of their
orders pending appeal.
As to the attitude toward hearing, there are numerous
examples in the reports of decisions of the federal courts.
Examples may be seen also in the monographs submitted to
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. There we are told that an investigation by the Railroad Retirement Board "is not necessarily a complete one
in that all sides may not be notified. ' ' 4 0 Indeed, the committee unanimously reported that the notice was too frequently inadequate and that administrative agencies frequently failed to apprise respondents fully of what they were
to meet, so as to permit adequate preparation of their defenses. But although the report as far back as 1941 urged
that notice ought fairly to "indicate what the respondent
ought to meet.,' ' 4 1 when the OPA adopted regulations as to
procedure it did not heed this admonition, and in June, 1943,
the Committee of the Bar Association of San Francisco reported that the provisions for notice and hearing were seriously inadequate. 42 After that report had been discussed
between the committee and representatives of OPA and a
final statement had been made in November, 1943, and given
much publicity by publication in December, the OPA on
March 6, 1944, put out new regulations, modifying its rules
to some extent to meet some of the serious possibilities of
abuse. But these new regulations were not to go into effect
till April 1, 1944, 3 so that the inadequate procedure was
retained many months after full notice of its objectionable
features. How obstinate this resistance to requirements of
fair hearing is may be seen from a case where, although the
statute required a hearing, the commission made orders with40.

Monographs, pt. 8, p. 11.

41.
42.
43.

Report of the Committee on Administrative Procedure, 62-63 (1941).
San Francisco Report, 9-11 (1943).
9 Federal Register, 2558, 2561 (1944).
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out notice or hearing and sought to obtain a rulir, g from the
court that they were not necessary. 4 Aversion to hearing
both sides on the part of federal administrative agencies is
fully shown in the monographs prepared for the Attorney
General's Committee in the report of that Committee, and
in the testimony taken before the Senate Subcommittee on
the bills proposed in that report. 45 While the statutes usually
prescribe them and the courts require them, the administrative agencies feel that hearings are not to ha:e any controlling influence upon determinations of facts.
Instead of determining upon evidence brought out at a
hearing of both sides, there is a tendency to make determinations on the basis of consultations had in private or of reports not divulged, giving the party affected no opportunity
to refute or explain. Sometimes these consultations are had
by correspondence.40
It was reported in the monographs
prepared for the Attorney General's Committee that the Federal Trade Commission made its decision on a record of
the evidence taken, with no report of the trial examiner,
and after decision and order referred the case back to the
trial examiner to make findings of fact in accord with the
decision.4
But the trial examiner did not hear oral argument nor participate in the decision. 4
The decision was
made without findings of fact and the facts were found
afterwards by one who did not hear argument. Thus the
findings of fact were based on the decision, not the decision
on the findings of fact. It stands out in the monographs
and in the reported decisions that many administrative agencies have been regarding a hearing as a mere form to create
an appearance of compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process of law. This puts the individual and
the individual business or enterprise at the mercy of subordinates in the commissions and bureaus.
Naturally the administrative agencies endeavor to cut
off or narrowly restrict judicial scrutiny of their procedure.
44. Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. Bituminous Coal Commission, 96 Fed.
2d, 517 (1938).
45. In one case set forth in the Monographs the administr.tive agency
objected to hearings because it feared that if it had to have a
hearing it would not have a record to sustain its order if challenged in court. Monographs, pt. 12, p. 26.
46. Monographs, pt. 7, p. 13; pt. 8, p. 23.
47. Id. pt. 6, pp. 26-27.
48. Id. 27.
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In a group of cases in which the National Mediation Board
held that one union was represented by another and the
statute did not provide expressly for review of this determination, the Supreme Court held the action of the Board not
reviewable unless made so by Congress. Mr. Justice Reed
(joined by Roberts, J., and Jackson, J. dissenting) said: "It
seems more consonant with the genius of our institutions
to assume, not that the purpose to apply a legal sanction
must be plain, but that in the absence of an expre.:, provision to the contrary, Congress intended the general judicial
authority conferred by the Judicial Code to be available to
a union and its members aggrieved by an administrative
order presumably irreconcilable with a statutory right so
explicitly framed as the right to bargain through representatives of the employees' own choosing."' 49 In another case
where Congress was held to have cut off judicial review,
Mr. Justice Murphy said: "That an individual should languish
in prison for five years without being accorded the opportunity of proving that the prosecution was based upon
arbitrary and illegal administrative action, is not in keeping
with the high standards of our judicial system."0 Again,
where regulations promulgated by the FCC in the exercise
of its rule-making power were challenged as beyond the Commission's statutory authority, the Commission argued that
this regulation could not be reviewed judicially till the
threatened irreparable injury to the business of the party
seeking review had been done. The Supreme Court of the
United States, dividing 6 to 2, held a suit to enjoin this
regulation maintainable. But the dissenting justices argued
that "even if the Commission committeed a wrong," 1 there
was no remedy in the courts unless Congress provided it,
and such seems to be coming to be the rule.
For a long time it had been the practice of the law
•officers of the government, when individuals desired to challenge the constitutionality of legislation adverse to their interests, to cooperate in test suits. But under the administrative regime this is not done. A business or enterprise
may find itself seriously embarrassed by the threat of a
49.

Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297,
321-322 (1943).

50. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 560-561 (1944).
51. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407,
429 (1942).
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statute or regulation which it believes to be uncoristitutional
or illegal, but may be kept in that condition indefinitely until
in order to relieve itself from suspense and uncertainty it
comes to some arrangement dictated by an administrative
agency. It is not considered a matter of public interest that
parties know what their rights are. It is assumed that
businesses and enterprises are inherently wrongloers and
their rights are inimical to policies which the administrative
agencies claim the power to identify with the public interest.
The attitude of these agencies was well put by the then chairman of the National Labor Relations Board: ".

.

. the re-

quirements of fair hearing do not permit inquiry into the
internal operation of the administrative agency... ."52
In the same spirit some administrative agencies argued
that there could be no stay of enforcement of their orders
pending review unless Congress expressly provided for it,
and others provided by rules a procedure for obtaining a
stay which in practice made it impossible of procurement.
An appeal without stay, where the order is destructive of a
business, is no remedy at all. A majority of the Supreme
Court of the United States was not willing to go so j'ar. They
held it proper to grant a stay, where review was allowable,
but left it to the administrative agency whether to girant one
in the particular case 3 Both defense and appeal seem to
be resented by many of these agencies.
Perhaps the worst feature of administrative procedure,
as it has developed since 1900, results from combining or
not differentiating the receiving of complaints, investigation
of them, bringing and conducting a prosecution upon them,
advocacy before the agency itself by its own subordinates in
the course of the prosecution, and adjudication. Thus the
adjudication becomes one by or with the advice and essistance
of those who investigated, prosecuted, and were advocates
for the prosecution. Such things are in clear derogation of
the fundamental maxim of justice that no one is to be judge
in his own case; no one is to be both accuser and judge."
52.
53.
54.

51 Rep. Va. State Bar Assn. 427 (1939).
Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission,
316 U.S. 4, 17 (1942).
Wilcox v. Royal Arcanum, 210 N.Y. 370 (1914); People v. Trustees, 4 App. Div. (N.Y.) 399, 401-403 (1896); People v. Kreinheder, 197 App. Div. (N.Y.) 887, 889 (1921); State v. Board of
Education, 19 Wash. 8, 17-18 (1898); Dimes v. Grand Junction
Canal, 3 H. of L. Cas. 759 (1852).
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From the beginning of our constitutional policy they have
been denounced. The English courts in the seventeenth century refused to allow even Parliament to provide for one
to judge his own case. 55 Courts today refuse to allow it where
policies of "nsurances or contracts or by-laws of corporations
provide for it.56 Over and again the courts a generation ago
held that if one of the members of an administrative body
made or promoted a charge his mere sitting at the hearing,
although he did not participate in decision, wo id vitiate an
order.'7 Yet the regime in which complaint L made to an
administrative agency, which takes it up, investigates it,
orders a hearing before itself on the complaint it has made
its own, advocates it at the hearing by its own counsel before one of its own staff as trial examiner or hearing commissioner, and renders an order depriving an individual of
some valuable right, involves an emotional interest in the result which precludes objective and impartial action as surely
as the pecuniary interest which has always been held to disqualify. The discussion of the procedure of the OPA in the
San Francisco report 8 is only one more illustration of the
vice of combining the functions of investigating, prosecuting
and judging in one administrative organization. The bad
features of this procedure are brought out in the monographs
prepared for the Attorney General's Committee and are recognized in the report of that Committee. 59 In some administrative proceedings this combination of roles has led to
procedures little short of scandalous.o But the Federal Communications Commission being "convinced that there was no
merit in segregation of functions in its work, and a good
deal to be gained by scrapping the distinction between prosecuting and judging a case" made a practice of deciding a
55.

Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114, 118 (1605); Day v. Savadge, Hobart,
212, 217-218 (1615); City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687-

688 (1701).
56.

Employees Benefit Assn. v. Johns, 30 Ariz. 609, 619 (1926);
Supreme Council v. Grove, 176 Ind. 356, 363 (1911).

57. State v. Crane, 36 N.J.L. 394, 404 (1873); Queen v. Justices of

Great Yarmouth, 8 Q.B.D. 525, 528 (1882); Reid v. Medical Society, 156 N.Y. Supp. 780, 790-791 (1915); Rex v. Hendon Rural

District Council [1933] 2 K.B. 696; Kuberski v. Haussermann, 113
N.J.L. 162, 170 (1934); Narragansett Racing Assn. v. Kierman,

59 R.I. 90, 105, 112-115 (1937).
58.

pp. 8-12.

59.
60.

E.g. Monographs, pt. 1, p. 16; pt. 3, p. 138.
House Rep. no. 3109, 76th Congress, 3d Session, pt. 1, p. 138.
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case as a whole, with no discrimination of fact, policy, and
law."' Thus, if it chose, it could reach its decikion in advance and promulgate it in an order after the form of a
hearing. The Report of the Attorney General's Committee
considered that, as a general policy, there ought to be at
least a separation of functions within each agency.6 2 But
the recommendations of the majority of the Committee go
no further than proposing a segregation within the agencies
themselves, and, in view of the close organization of those
agencies and the esprit de corps they develop, what was proposed does not reach and could not affect the actual situation.
Nothing has been done toward remedying this condition.
Even the small measure of relief proposed by the majority
of the Attorney General's Committee has not been pushed.
The American Bar Association measure proposes to deal with
this subject effectively.
A specially bad feature of the procedure of these agencies is the great power which is given to small subordinates.6 3
The then chairman of the NLRB said to a Bar Association
Institute in April, 1939: "The Board members cartnot expect
to read the records. In making its decision the Board, therefore, avails itself of assistants ..... The review attorneys
analyze the evidence, inform the Board of the contentions
of all the parties and the testimony relating thereto, and,
after decision by the Board, make initial drafts of the Board's
findings and order." 64 The contrast to judicial methods is
significant. The report of a master may be excelrted to and
argued to the court. What these review attorney,3 informed
the Board could only be conjectured and there was no opportunity to except to it or to argue as to it. If aa appellate
court decides on an abstract, it is one agreed on by the
parties or settled after hearing both as to what it should
contain, settled before argument of the case, and available
to both parties at the argument, so that those -.
vho argue
and those who decide have the same material before them.
Decision on the basis of abstracts of the record not accessible
to the parties would not be tolerated in a court. It is obvious
why the agency in question objected to judicial inquiry into
61.
62.
63.
64.

Monographs, pt. 3, p. 29.
Report of the Attorney General's Committee, 207-210.
See Hearing before Senate Subcommittee on Bills Proposed by
Majority and Minority of Attorney General's Committee (1941).
51 Rep. Va. State Bar Assn., 414, 415 (1939).
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its "internal operations."6 5 The general attitude of too many
of these agencies today is illustrated by the objection of the
NLRB to a provision recommended by the minority of the
Attorney General's Committee intended to emphasize the responsibility of the individual official. Many cannot afford
the expense of formal hearings and judicial review. Their
only reliance is on the fairness of a multitude of subordinates. There is need of emphasizing that these subordinates
have a responsibility beyond that of carrying out in every
way the general aims of the organization. They ought to
feel that they are under a responsibility of dealing fairly
with all parties whose interests are involved. That an authoritative statement of this responsibility, such as we have in
the canons of judicial ethics, should be objected to as "dangerous" can only mean that it is thought dangerous to a policy
of unfairness toward those whom the administrative agency
is pursuing.
It is not, as some would have us think, merely a question of protecting wealthy wrongdoers and great corporations
from reasonable regulation. They alone have a certain degree
of protection by suits for injunctions and by contesting in
the courts enforcement of administrative regulations. But
suits for injunction are expensive, other judicial remedies
have become much limited, and in the multiplicity and diversity of statutes and regulations it is often difficult to
know what they are and how to pursue them. Hence it has
become a question of protecting the average business and
the small business and the individual man. These cannot
afford to bring expensive injunction suits and carry them
through to the Supreme Court at Washington, with a certainty that the administrative agency will resist to the last,
will have an ample staff of bureau lawyers, bureau experts,
and the law officers of the government behind it. The
ordinary business and the ordinary man are coerced into
settlements and consent decrees to their injury and in defiance of their rights. Nothing has been done to impose
effective checks upon administrative adjudication and administrative rule-making by legislation and by providing simple,
expeditious, not too expensive procedure for judicial review.
The American Bar Association measure seeks to achieve this.
When one points out the characteristics of the exercise
65. Ibid. 427.
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of administrative powers of adjudication as they ],ave developed in recent years, he is not attacking the responsible
members of the federal administrative agencieS nor impugning their intentions or motives. Administrative agencies
in the states, in England, and in Australia show like tendencies. It is the system rather than the man which is chiefly
at fault. What is behind those characteristics is largely zeal
in carrying out laws which are felt by those cho3en to administer them to be of such paramount importonce as to
justify the means by the end. It has been argued )y an able
exponent of the administrative standpoint that .ve should
look at the exercise of administrative authority "against a
background of what we now expect government t, do." If
we keep our eye too exclusively on that background we may
overlook the importance of how we expect governxaent to do
it. The effect of well intentioned zeal upon administrative
action has often been remarked. The British Commission
speaks of "bias from strong and sincere conviction as to
public policy, '' o and we have had many examplEs of how
such convictions could lead administrative agencies to substitute policies of their own creation for those Cor gress had
set up in the statute creating the agency. 67 Speaking of the
tendency of administrative agencies to look at all questions
exclusively in the light of their immediate narrow task, Mr.
Justice Byrnes said: "It is sufficient for this case ,o observe
that the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that
it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statuatory scheme to another, and it is not too much to demand of
an administrative body that it undertakes this accorunodation
without any excessive emphasis on its immediate task."'68
As a witness at the hearing on the proposals oC the Attorney General's Committee before the Senate Sub.nommittee
put it: "Administrators have a tendency to become so wrapped up in their objectives that they are often unnecessarily
66. Report of the British Commission on Ministers' Powers, 78.
67.
68.

See the remarks of Hughes, C.J. in National LaborC Relations
Board v. Fansteel Metalurgical Corporation, 306 U.S. 240, 255,
260-261 (1939).
Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1912).
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unmindful of private rights. ' ' 69 The present Attorney General, when Solicitor General, testifying before the Senate
Subcommittee in 1941, put this tendency as an excuse for not
effectively segregating the judging from the prosecuting
function, saying that administrative boards were set up to
carry out policies and make that the paramount consideration.70 This attitude on the part of high officials of government may well aggravate the features of exercise of administrative authority which have been growing up. Under such
conditions an idea of using their powers not merely to advance the policy of the statute but of using them to change
the whole social and economic order and reach visionary
ultimate social objectives beyond or against the policy of the
statute easily takes possession of subordinates entrusted with
large authority. As Mr. Justice Brandeis admonished us,
nowhere is cautious scrutiny of governmental action so much
needed as when the government is acting from the best of
motives.
By no means all administrative agencies or officials are
unfair. But experience has shown that many are and that
many more are mistakenly over-zealous at the expense of
the citizen and seek to be efficient by overriding individual
rights. Told by teachers of administrative law that "partisanship is to be expected" and taking literally the general
statement of the attitude of the zealous administrator, the
administrative agencies habitually do the things illustrated
by the cases discussed above.
Great stress has been laid on the simple, nontechnical
methods of administrative agencies. But in the hands of
agencies not disposed to be scrupulously fair, these simple,
nontechnical methods easily serve as traps for the citizen
who is seeking to obey the law. Let two examples suffice. In
one case a state agency was empowered to classify telephone
companies as urban or rural and their liabilities depended
upon the classification. A small company applied to the
commission to be classified as a rural company and received
a letter on the letterhead of the commission, signed in the
name of the commission by its secretary that the company's
exchange could be classified as rural and that the exchange
69. Hearings on Administrative Procedure, U.S. Senate Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary (1941) p. 1295.
70. Ibid. 1433.
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might "be governed by the rules regulating such a classification." After acting on this for five years, the company was
held liable, as having operated an urban exchange, because
there was no record of an order of the bureau but merely a
statement by its secretary which did not purport to be
authorized by the bureau (though signed in its nIiame by its
secretary) and did not state who authorized the secretary
71
to make the statement.
In another recent case a company was charged with violating a ration order of the OPA. The Hearing Commissioner
held there had been no wilful violation but that. there was
carelessness and suspended the company from selling, transferring, or dealing for two weeks, involving a loss of $10,000.
On appeal this order was sustained by the Bearing Administrator. It appeared that an employee of the company
telephoned to the OPA office for advice and did what a
subordinate in the office said to do.7 2 As it is put as one
of the advantages of the administrative regime that advice
is given in advance, whereas courts can only act after things
have been done or controversies have arisen, it would seem
that administrative agencies are chargeable with negligence
in such cases rather than the parties who apply to them, and
that they ought to supervise their employees more thoroughly,
in deference to fairness to the citizen, rather thar look solely
to a policy of maximum enforcement of their regulations.
We cannot, as some suggest, attribute the administrative absolutism which has grown up in recent years to the
emergency of war. The condition which confronts our
American constitutional policy had grown strong before the
war. An article by Dean Wigmore, published m.nJanuary,
1939, pointed out the enormous multiplication of federal
agencies, their vast powers, and the great difficulty of ascertaining their practice and policies.73 In April, 1939, federal
administrative law was the subject of an Institute held under
the auspices of the Virginia State Bar Association, in which
administrative absolutism was discussed. On August 3, 1939,
the President of the Virginia State Bar Association delivered
an address entitled "Administrative Law and Liberty" in
71. Wiseth v. Traill County Telephone Co., 70 N.D. 44 (1940).
72.
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which he declared the need of a measure, such as the American Bar Association had been at work upon for two years,
in view of what he called the "demand for wholesale power..
** over the lives and liberties of our people" made by administrative agencies.75 All this was before the war broke out
in Europe and long before we entered the war. Moreover,
in 1933 the American Bar Association appointed a special
committee on administrative law, which has been maintained
ever since. In 1937, Attorney General Cummings appointed
a committee to study and report on administrative procedure.
In 1940, the Walter-Logan bill, based on a draft adopted by
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
passed both houses of Congress, but was vetoed, chiefly on
the ground that the matter should await the report of the
Attorney General's Committee. The most that can be said
is that the tendencies which had developed increasingly during and after the prohibition regime have been given added
momentum by the exigencies of the war.
Such things as we see in the conduct of administrative
adjudication today belong to lands which believe in government by an omnicompretent superman, with supermen under
him, to whom the life, liberty and property of the citizen are
to be subordinated; who are so all-wise as to know offhand
what the public interest demands in each case and need no
hearings or evidence or arguments to advise them, but are
to adjust all relations and order all conduct by the light
of their ex officio wisdom in a political organization of society
which does not recognize private rights. If, as recent realists
tell us, a government is in fact simply the office holders of
the moment, and so the rule of men rather than of law is
the rule of human beings, who may act from the greatest
variety of motives, political expediency, prejudice, spite, mistaken zeal, and may be at times fair and at others ruthless
and unreasonable, it is obvious what a theory of law as
whatever is done officially may lead to.
There has come to be a cult of force throughout the
world. In place of the political and legal theory on which
our government was founded and under which America has
grown to be a land to which people have been eager to come
from every, part of the world in order to live the lives of
free men and enjoy life, liberty, and property in security,
75.

Ibid. 246, 252.
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new theories are being advanced. Instead of our fundamental
doctrine that government is to be carried on according to
law, we are told that what the government does is law. Instead of a law which thinks of citizens and officials as
equally subject to law, we are told of a public law which
subordinates the citizen to the official and enables the latter
to put the claims of one citizen over those of another, not
according to some general rule of law but accorCing to his
personal idea for the time being. A give-it-up philosophy
of law and government is being widely taught. We are
told that law is to disappear in -the society of the future.
We are told of a society in which an omnicompetent and
benevolent government will provide for the satisfaction of
the material wants of every one and there will be no need
of adjusting relations or ordering conduct by law since every
one will be satisfied. Thus there will be no rights. There
will only be a general duty of passive obedience. We need
to bestir ourselves that while we are combatting regimes of
this sort, as they have developed in dictatorships and totalitarian governments, we do not allow a regime of autocratic
bureaus to become so intrenched at home as to lead us in
the same direction.

